文档介绍：Chapter 41
STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM*
ERIC VAN DAMME
CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, herlands
Contents
1. Introduction 1523
2. Nash equilibria in normal form games 1525
. Generalities 1525
2,2. Self-enforcing theories of rationality 1526
2,3. Structure, regularity and generic finiteness 1531
. Computation of equilibria: The 2-person case 1535
2,5. Purification of mixed strategy equilibria 1537
3. Backward induction equilibria in extensive form garnes 1539
. Extensive form and related normal forms 1540
. Subgame perfect equilibria 1543
. Perfect equilibria 1546
. Sequential equilibria 1549
. Proper equilibria 1551
4. Forward induction and stable sets of equilibria 1553
. Set-valuedness as a consequence of desirable properties 1554
. Desirable properties for strategic stability 1558
. Stable sets of equilibria 1561
. Applications of stability criteria 1565
. Robustness and persistent equilibria 1567
5. Equilibrium selection 1572
. Overview of the Harsanyi and Selten solution procedure 1573
. Risk dominance in 2 x 2 garnes 1576
. Risk dominance and the tracing procedure 1580
. Risk dominance and payoff dominance 1585
. Applications and variations 1586
. Final remark 1589
References 1589
*This paper was written in 1994, and no attempt has been made to provide a survey of the developments since
then. The author thanks two anonymous referees and the editors for ments.
Handbook of Garne Theory, Volume 3, Edited by . Aumann and S. Hart
© 2002 Elsevier Science . All rights reserved
1522 E. van Damme
Abstract
This chapter of the Handbook of Garne Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the
theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic
approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing
theory of rational behavior in non-