文档介绍：目录
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Model
Repair Process and Inventory Policy
Cost Structure
Information Structure
Contract Types and Payoffs
Signaling Game
4. Benchmark: First-Best plete Information
5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
Resource-Based Contract
Performance-Based Contract
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
Resource-Based Contract
Performance-Based Contract
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability
Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
8. Conclusions
1. Introduction
供货商
买方
产品
PBC
RBC
可靠性
私有信息
使用
备用库存
维护
背景介绍
文献回顾
2. Literature Review
PBC for outsourced services
asymmetric information in operations management
the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism
建模
3. Model
Repair Process and Inventory Policy
N: identical copies;
B: inventory backorder;
s: inventory;
The expected backorders in steady state is
Availability is equal to
建模
Cost Structure
Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r ≥ 0.
The buyer’s expected cost is equal to
The vendor’s expected cost is equal to
建模
Information Structure
We assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability.
Hazard rate ordering(危险率序):
Excess wealth ordering(剩余财富序):
建模
Contract Types and Payoffs
We can write the buyer’s expected payoff as
The vendor’s expected payoff is given by
RBC:
PBC:
建模
Signaling Game
We assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at θ.
We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.
建模
4. Benchmark: First-Best plete Information
Given the vendor type τ