文档介绍：自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资
李鑫
(山东大学管理学院,山东济南 250100)
摘要:处于经理人控制之下的自由现金流有可能被投入到损害公司价值的非盈利项目上,从而导致过度投资。股利代理成本理论认为,较高的股利支付水平可以迫使经理人“吐出”自由现金流,从而降低企业自由现金流代理成本。但本文实证研究表明,中无关。其原因在于,上市公司股利政策受到监管层政策驱动因素的影响,造成股利政策扭曲,并被“异化”为大股东“利益输送”的一种手段。
关键词:过度投资;股利政策;自由现金流
中图分类号: 文献标识码:A
作者简介:李鑫,山东大学管理学院博士生,研究方向:公司金融与财务管理。
Free Cash Flow,Cash Dividend and Over-investment of Chinese panies
LI Xin
(School of Management,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China)
Abstract: Free cash flow is under the control of manager in pany. Manager has the capability of investing corporate fund to non-profit projects which could bring himself private benefit,which make pany face the risk of over-investment. The agency cost of dividend theory refers that a high rate of dividend payment could make manager e extra free cash flow,which would reduce the agency cost of free cash flow and the risk of over-investment. But the empirical research of Chinese panies proves that,the over-investment degree of pany has no direct relation with the rate of dividend payment. The dividend policy of Chinese panies has been distorted by the regulatory measures and the purpose of secondary offerings. And the cash dividend payment has turned to a method of “tunneling” under the unbalanced ownership structure of panies.
Key Words: over-investment;dividend policy;free cash flow
问题的提出
融资决策、投资决策和股利政策一起构成了现代企业财务决策的