文档介绍：Language as Thought and munication
Wilfrid Sellars
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Jun., 1969), pp. 506-527.
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Sat May 12 01:02:38 2007
LANGUAGEAS THOUGHT AND MUNICATION 507
tions are intrinsically interesting and relevant to the general topic of this
paper, I shall not discuss them. For however the domain of norms ad
standards is to be stratified and botanized, the term 'rule' has acquired
over the years a technical and generic sense in which it applies to general
statements concerning that which ought or ought not to be done or to
be the case, or to be permissible or not permissible - distinctions which
can be put in many different ways.
For our purposes, then, a rule is roughly a general 'ought' statement.
Such statements have been traditionally divided into hypothetical and
categorical 'oughts,' or, as it has often misleadingly been put, 'impera-
tives.'