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A Course in Game Theory-Solution Manual v1.2 (M.J. Osborne & A. Rubenstein) [MIT PRESS, 1994].pdf

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A Course in Game Theory-Solution Manual v1.2 (M.J. Osborne & A. Rubenstein) [MIT PRESS, 1994].pdf

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文档介绍:Solution Manual for
A Course in Game Theory
Solution Manual for
A Course in Game Theory
by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein
with the assistance of Wulong Gu
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Copyright
c 1994 Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and
retrieval) without permission in writing from the authors.
This manual was typeset by the authors, who are greatly indebted to Donald Knuth (the
creator of TEX), Leslie Lamport (the creator of LATEX), and Eberhard Mattes (the creator
of emTEX) for generously putting superlative software in the public domain, and to Ed
Sznyter for providing critical help with the macros we use to execute our numbering
scheme.
Version , 2005/1/17
Contents
Preface ix
2 Nash Equilibrium 1
Exercise (First price auction) 1
Exercise (Second price auction) 1
Exercise (War of attrition) 2
Exercise (Location game) 2
Exercise (Necessity of conditions in Kakutani’s theorem) 3
Exercise (Symmetric games) 3
Exercise (Increasing payoffs in petitive game) 3
Exercise (BoS with imperfect information) 4
Exercise (Exchange game) 4
Exercise (More information may hurt) 4
3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium 7
Exercise (Guess the average) 7
Exercise (Investment race) 7
Exercise (Guessing right) 8
Exercise (Air strike) 8
Exercise (Technical result on convex sets) 9
Exercise (Examples of Harsanyi’s purification) 9
Exercise (Example of correlated equilibrium) 10
Exercise (Existence of ESS in 2 × 2 game) 10
4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions 11
Exercise (Example of rationalizable actions) 11
Exercise (Cournot duopoly) 11
Exerci