文档介绍：June10,200373-347GameTheory--pleteandPerfectInformationJune10,200373-347GameTheory--pleteinformationExtensive-pleteandperfectinformationGametreeSubgame-pleteandimperfectinformationMoreapplicationsRepeatedgamesJune10,200373-347GameTheory--Lecture153Today’sAgendaReviewofpreviousclassSubgame-perfectNashequilibriumBackwardinductionStackelberg’smodelofduopoly(,)Sequential-moveBertrandmodelofduopoly(differentiatedproducts)June10,200373-347GameTheory--,200373-347GameTheory---1,11,-1HTPlayer2HT1,-1-1,1astrategyforplayer1:Hastrategyforplayer2:Hifplayer1playsH,Tifplayer1playsT(writtenasHT)Player1’spayoffis-1andplayer2’spayoffis1ifplayer1playsHandplayer2playsHTJune10,200373-347GameTheory--Lecture156NashequilibriuminadynamicgameWecanalsousenormal-pleteinformationisthesetofNashequilibriaofitsnormal-pleteinformationConstructthenormal-pleteinformationFindtheNashequilibriainthenormal-formJune10,200373-347GameTheory--Lecture157Subgame-perfectNashequilibriumANashequilibriumofadynamicgameissubgame--,200373-347GameTheory--Lecture158SubgameAsubgameofagametreebeginsatanonterminalnodeandincludesallthenodesandedgesfollowingthenonterminalnodeAsubgamebeginningatanonterminalnodexcanbeobtainedasfollows:removetheedgeconnectingxanditspredecessortheconnectedpartcontainingxisthesubgame-1,1Player1Player2HT1,-1HTPlayer2HT1,-1-1,1asubgameJune10,200373-347GameTheory--Lecture159Existenceofsubgame-pleteandperfectinformationhasasubgame-,200373-347G