文档介绍：Game Theory and Economic Modelling
Kreps, David M
Paul E. Holden Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business , Stanford University
Contents
1. Introduction
2. The standard
3. Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory
Strategic form games
Extensive form games
Extensive and strategic form games
Dominance
Nash equilibrium
4. The esses of game theory
Taxonomy based on the strategic form
Dynamics and extensive form games
Incredible threats and incredible promises
Credible threats and promises: Co-operation and reputation
The importance of what players know about others
Interactions among parties holding private information
Concluding remarks
5. The problems of game theory
The need for precise protocols
Too many equilibria and no way to choose
Choosing among equilibria with refinements
The rules of the game
1
6. Bounded rationality and retrospection
Why study Nash equilibria?
The case for bounded rationality and retrospection
A line of attack
Historical antecedents and recent examples
Objections to this general approach, with rebuttals
Similarities: Or, Deduction and prospection is bounded rationality and
retrospection
The other problems of game theory
Final words
Bibliography
Index
2
Acknowledgements
This book provides a lengthened account of a series of lectures given
at the Tel Aviv University under the aegis of the Sackler Institute for
Advanced Studies and the Department of Economics in January 1990 and
then at Oxford University in the Clarendon Lecture Series while I was a
guest of St Catherine's College in February 1990. (Chapter 3 contains
material not given in the lecture series that is useful for readers not
conversant with the basic notions of non-cooperative game theory.) I am
grateful to both sets of institutions for their hospitality in the event and
for their financial support. I am also pleased to acknowledge the fina