文档介绍：Game theory and political theory: an introduction
Game theory
and political theory
An introduction
PETER C. ORDESHOOK
University of Texas at Austin
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
© Cambridge University Press 1986
First published 1986
Reprinted 1987, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1995
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 0-521-30612-4 hardback
ISBN 0-521-31593-X paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2003
Contents
page
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
1 Individual preference and individual choice 1
Some fundamental notation and definitions 2
Actions 3
es 4
States of nature 9
Preferences 10
The preference relation 12
Ordinal utility 13
Multiattribute es 16
Decision making under certainty 28
Constrained economic decisions 29
Constrained political decisions 32
Decision making under risk 37
The meaning of cardinal utility 42
Cardinal utility and subjective probability 48
Allais's paradox 48
The calculus of voting 49
Summary 51
2 Individual preference and social choice 53
Arrow's impossibility result 56
Paradoxes of voting 65
The agenda paradox 65
The contrived Condorcet paradox 66
The dominated-winner paradox 67
The inverted-order paradox 68
The winner-turns-loser paradox 69
The truncated point-total paradox 70
The majority-winner paradox 70
The power of agendas 71
Misrepresentation of preferences 82
vi Contents
Vote trading 89
Summary 94
3 Basic theory of noncooperative games 97
Noncooperative games: an example 98
Games in extensive form: the game tree 99
Strategy and the normal form 106
Norma