文档介绍：CAMBRIDGE
STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY
PRACTICAL
RULES
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Practical Rules
Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering
on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that
injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make
exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular
circumstances that they ignore?
The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the
particularist account, which rejects the relevance of genuine rules, and
that which sees the application of rules as standard. Taking a position
that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to
provide a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules
in our moral, legal, and prudential decisions and when we ought not to
do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates
concepts such as integrity, self-interest, and self-deception; and finally, it
provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules.
This book will be great interest to advanced students and profes-
sionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory, and the social sci-
ences.
Alan H. Goldman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami.
He is author of Empirical Knowledge (1988), Moral Knowledge (1988),
and Aesthetic Value (1995).
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cambridge studies in philosophy
General editor ernest sosa (Brown University)
Advisory editors:
jonathan dancy (University of Reading)
john haldane (University of St. Andrews)
gilbert harman (Princeton University)
frank jackson (Australian National University)
william g. lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
sydney shoemaker (Cornell University)
judith j. thomson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
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