文档介绍：国企经营者薪酬兑现与企业绩效的实证研究
预测Vol. 31, FORECASTlNG 2012年第1期国企经营者薪酬|兑现与企业绩效的实证研究杨水利,姚瑶{西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054) 摘要:企业经营者薪酬兑现制度是激励与约束机制的重要内容,其即时性可以实现对企业经营者的短期激励,精后性有利于经营者的长期激励和约束。本文选取我国部分国有控股制造业上市公司的经营者为研究对象,以经营者行为作为中介变量研究薪酬兑现方式与企业绩效之间的关系,研究表明:当期兑现对经营者短期导向行为有显著影响,;延期兑现对经营者长期导向行为有显著影响,对企业成长绩效有正向影响。研究结论对于选择适合的经营者薪酬兑现时机及兑现方式提供了理论依据。关键词:国有企业:薪酬兑现;经营者行为;企业绩效中图分类号::A文章编号:1003-5192 (2012) 01-0027-07 A Positive Study of State-owned Enterprise Manager’ s Salary Cash and Enterprise Performances Y ANG Shui-li, Y AO Yao ( Facultr 01 Economic8 and Management,刀'anUniversitr 01 Technology, Xi’ an 710054, China) Abstract: The salary cash system enterprise of manager is an important item in the incentive and constraint mechanism. Its real instant can achieve the short-term effective incentive for the enterprise manager, and its delay can realize the long-term incentive and constraint for the enterprise manager. This paper ?elects many enterprise managers of part of state-owned enterprises and the state-owned holding manufacturing pany in our country as the research objects. The manager’ s behavior is as the intermediate variables for studying the function relationship between the salary ca?h means and the enterprise performances. The resu\ts show that the current pay enca?ement makes marked effect to the manager short-term guiding behaviors. It makes positive effect to the enterprise operating performance. The deferred pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager long-term guiding behavior?. It makes positive effect to the enterprise growing results from the positive study can provide the theoretical basis for pany. It shows that how to select the suitable cash opportunities and salary cash means. Key words: stste-owned ente甲rise;salary cash; manager behaviors; enterprise performances 现为经营者重现金支付,轻股权期权支付。由于经1 引曹营者受聘经营管理企业,存在任职期限,虽然这种随着我国市场经济的发展,国有企业经营者薪;资饭碗;具有一定程度的压力及动力,但是经营酬制度的缺陷日渐突出,表现在:一方面企业经营者极可能更注重短期盈利、追求高额回报,轻视企者薪酬结构不合理、长短期激励失衡、不同