文档介绍：K. J. KRAAY
EXTERNALISM, MEMORY, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
ABSTRACT. Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on
factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there
is aprioriself-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their
thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile
externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim
that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this
charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little
explanatory value.
Externalism holds that mental content is individuated by factors external
to the subject: “individuating many of a person or animal’s mental kinds
– certainly including thoughts about physical objects and properties – is
necessarily dependent on relations that the person bears to the physical,
or in some cases social, environment”(Burge 1988, 650). This doctrine
appears to undermine two extremely plausible claims. First, externalism
seems inconsistent with the view that there is aprioriself-knowledge.
(If mental content is individuated partly by factors external to S,then
it seems that S must investigate the external world in order to know
her own thoughts.) Second, if externalism rules out self-knowledge, it is
also inconsistent with the thesis that individuals have privileged access to
their thoughts. (Without self-knowledge, privileged access is impossible.)1
Tyler Burge’s inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile ex-
ternalism with authoritative self-knowledge (Burge 1998).2 He identifies a
class of “cogito-like beliefs”; beliefs of the form “I think (herewith) that
writing requires concentration” or “I am thinking that water is a liquid”.
Burge considers these to be paradigmatic instances of self-knowledge, and
he reasons that in such c