文档介绍：Chapter 26
THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
HOWARD K. GRUENSPECHT AND LESTER B. LAVE
Carnegie-Mellon University
Contents
1. Introduction 1508
. Economists' disinterest in externalities 1508
. An increased public demand for regulation 1509
. Regulatory reform 1510
. A zoology of concerns 1511
2o A gallery of externalities and information management approaches 1513
. Externalities 1513
. Optimal regulation of environmental pollution 1514
. Cost effectiveness 1520
. Modeling health and safety regulation 1522
3. Goal-setting 1528
3,1. Social goals 1528
3,2. Paternalism revisited 1531
3,3. Defining social goals through process 1532
4. Quantification and valuation of benefits 1534
. Quantifying the benefits 1534
. Valuation of nonmarket goods and services 1535
5. Implementation issues 1537
. How much room for improvement? 1537
. Dynamic issues in regulation 1538
. pensation 1540
. Contradictory regulation 1540
. Effects on the economy 1541
. Distribution of HSE benefits and costs 1542
6. Noneconomic issues 1542
. Environmental impact statements 1543
. Risk analysis and management 1543
7. Conclusion 1543
References 1544
Handbook of anization, Volume II, Edited by R. Schmalensee and . Willig
© Elsevier Science Publishers B, V., 1989
1508 . Gruenspecht and LB. Lave
1. Introduction
. Economists" disinterest in externafities
Economists have long recognized the theoretical possibility of externalities and
their role in disrupting the efficiency petitive equilibrium. More recently,
the incentive and appropriability features of information markets have raised
questions regarding the efficiency of the private market as a mechanism for
generating and disseminating information.
Environmental pollution clearly constitutes an externality. Moreover, in a
setting where information is i