文档介绍：Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
Author(s): David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 3, (Jul., 2001), pp. 315-360
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: ble/2693648
Accessed: 03/07/2008 12:45
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The PhilosophicalReview, Vol. 110, No. 3 (July 2001)
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson
1. Introduction
Is conceptualanalysis required for reductiveexplanation? If there is
no a priori entailment from microphysicaltruths to phenomenal
truths,does reductiveexplanation of the phenomenalfail? We sayyes
(Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert
Stalnakersay no (Blockand Stalnaker1999).
A number of issuescan be distinguished:
(1) Is there an a priorientailment from microphysicaltruths
to ordinarymacroscopic truths?
(2) If there is no a priori entailment