文档介绍：Information and Learning in Markets
Information and Learning in Markets
The Impact of Market Microstructure
Xavier Vives
Princeton University Press
Princeton and Oxford
Copyright © 2008 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press,
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In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press,
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ISBN: 978-0-691-12743-9 (alk. paper)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008921431
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
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A l’Aurora
A la memòria de la mare i al Martí—que promet continuar la saga
Contents
Preface xi
Introduction and Lecture Guide 1
References 12
1 Aggregation of Information in Simple Market Mechanisms: Large Markets 15
Introduction and Overview 15
Large Cournot Markets 17
Welfare in Large Cournot Markets with Asymmetric Information 27
Information Aggregation in Smooth Large Markets 29
Auctions and Voting 38
Endogenous Information Acquisition 40
Summary 45
Appendix 46
Exercises 48
References 51
2 Aggregation of Information in Simple Market Mechanisms: How
Large Is Large? 53
A General Linear-Normal Cournot Model 54
Convergence to Price Taking in a Cournot Market 57
Endogenous Information Acquisition 58
Convergence to the First-Best: Market Power and
Information Aggregation 62
Convergence in Auctions 67
Summary 70
Appendix 71
Exercises 74
References 76
3 Rational Expectations and Supply petition 78
Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Concepts, Problems, and Welfare 78
Supply petition and REE in a Continuum Economy 84
Welfare Analysis of REE 95
Strategic Supply Function Equilibria an