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文档介绍

文档介绍:: Problems of Philosophy
Prof. Sally Haslanger
September 26, 2001
Evidentialism v. Pragmatism
1. The "Wager" and the Practical Rationality Principle
Practical Rationality Principle: The practically rational thing to do is the thing with the highest expected value (or
"utility").
Version A: Do the thing with higher expected value than all petitors.
--In the case of a tie, neither action/belief is permitted.
Version B: Find the actions with highest expected value and perform whichever of them you like.
--In the case of a tie, Theism is practically rational. (Just like choosing pie over cake.)
2. Evidentialism (Clifford)
"It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (p. 124)
First objection: Problem is not with evidence, but with falsity of beliefs.
Clifford's response: There is an all-important difference between the beliefs we are entitled to hold and those we arenít.
The beliefs we are entitled to hold are the ones supported by the evidence, ., the supported beliefs. Nothing else is
relevant..
Second objection: Clifford's examples all involve beliefs that matter, ., ones that have consequences for the welfare of
others. This suggests that maybe what's wrong is holding unsupported beliefs that can reasonably be expected to cause
harm. What about harmless beliefs?
Note