文档介绍：: Problems of Philosophy
Prof. Sally Haslanger
October 10, 2001
The Problem of Induction
Although James and Clifford disagree about the reasonableness of belief in a special class of propositions (when they
constitute a genuine choice for us), they agree that in the majority of cases empirical investigation and the scientific pursuit
of evidence is at least a, if not the proper way to proceed in forming beliefs. It appears that at least on most matters and
especially in cases where we might be prone to systematic distortion, we'd do well to conscientiously gather empirical
evidence before deciding what to believe. They both maintain, in fact, that scientific inquiry is to be contrasted with belief
based in faith. Is this contrast warranted?
The problem of induction challenges the alleged contrast. The problem has two parts.
i) The descriptive problem: How do we form opinions about unobserved matters of fact?
ii) The normative problem: Is our way of forming opinions about unobserved matters of fact legitimate, justified?
., is our "reasoning" about unobserved matters of fact valid?
Let's begin with (i). We're focusing on opinions about things we haven't observed, ., things we aren't now perceiving and
haven't perceived in the past. How do we form such opinions? In some cases the matter is trivial: I believe that all squares
have