文档介绍：本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings
Around Option Grants
Recent academic research and regulatory action strongly suggest that managers intervene in governance and reporting processes to increase the value of their option pay (., Heron and Lie 2007; Balsam, Chen, and Sankaraguruswamy 2003; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Forelle and Bandler 2006). Collectively, results from prior research indicate that managers can pursue a variety of insider-trading strategies involving signals about firm performance, changes in share prices, and the timing of option grant dates. These strategies generally reflect three apparent forms of opportunism: (a) selectively releasing voluntary disclosures around grant dates, (b) backdating grants to periods of lower share prices, and (c) managing quarterly earnings in periods leading up to grant dates. mon theme of this research is that managers appear to use private information about firm performance or grant dates — or both — to execute an option-related strategy. Arguably, such actions can lead to lower exercise prices and higher subsequent payoffs. From a public policy perspective, this issue is important enough that regulators have specifically targeted two of the above strategies. First, the Securities and mission (SEC) severely curtailed the selective release of voluntary disclosures by issuing Regulation FD in 2000. Second, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress discouraged option backdating by requiring timelier reporting of grants. However, these actions could unintentionally lead to increased pressure to manage earnings as part of an option-related strategy, a consequence that seems inconsistent with the SEC's overall mandate for improved earnings quality (Levitt 1999; Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002).
To address this issue, we examine the discretionary ponent of
earnings and its relation to the timing of executive option grants. In particular, we focus on grants made shortly after the quarterly earnin