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绩效评估,经济增加值和管理行为【外文翻译】.doc

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绩效评估,经济增加值和管理行为【外文翻译】.doc

上传人:问道九霄 2012/1/6 文件大小:0 KB

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绩效评估,经济增加值和管理行为【外文翻译】.doc

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文档介绍:本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文一:
Performance Evaluation, Economic Value Added and
Managerial Behavior
For the past two decades many countries started transforming their economies from traditional protected ones to those of more liberalized, globalized and market driven. This period has also seen the economies ing more knowledge oriented and Human Resources started assuming more prominence in the growth of the economies and businesses posing a greater challenge panies to acquire and retain talented workforce (especially at the strategic & managerial levels).
The knowledge economy also started witnessing the rapid rise of the agency problem- conflict of interest between managers and owners. So it is very essential to align the interests of the mangers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference between them. In this regard Economic Value Added has been seen as better alternative to the stock price and traditional performance measures.
While essful EVA stories in the west are quite encouraging, Corporate India is slowly catching up the EVA adoption. Although not a panacea, EVA pensation plans will drive managers employ a firm’s assets more productively and EVA should help reduce the difference in the interests of the managers and shareholders, if not perfectly align them
Traditional Measures of Managerial Performance
Shareholders want the maximization of stock price (firm value). So can we measure the performance of a manager directly as reflected by the stock price-Reward managers when stock price goes up and punish them if stock prices behave otherwise? This approach has a major limitation. ‘Stock price is driven by so many factors that escape from the control of managers, making it an inefficient measure of the true influence of the mangers on firm’s value. ‘Changes in stock price - in the short run at least – are not always accurate gauze of management performance due to the presence of randomness and noise’(Kang et al, 2002). Tying top pensation to stock pr