文档介绍：Competition for Listings ∗
Thierry Foucault
HEC, School of Management and CEPR
78351 Jouy en Josas, France.
Email:******@
Christine A. Parlour
., Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA, 15213,
Email: ******@.
July, 2000
∗We are grateful to seminar participants at the AFA2000 meetings, the CEPR/CSEF/NYSE
Conference on Primary Markets, the FMG conference on the Future of Exchanges, ESSEC,
, Hebrew University, INSEAD, the ., Universit´e Catholique de Louvain and to Yakov
Amihud, Patrick Bolton, Rick Green, Pekka Hietala, Burton Hollifield, Harald Hau, Uday Rajan,
Bryan Routledge, Neal Stoughton, S. Viswanathan, Jean-Pierre Zygrand for ments.
We also thank Marianne Demarchi and Solemne Thomas from the SBF for providing us with
information regarding listing requirements in various exchanges. Funding from the Carnegie
Bosch Institute is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are ours.
Abstract
We develop a model in which stock pete for IPO listings. They choose
the listing fees paid by entrepreneurs wishing to go public and control the trading costs
incurred by investors. All entrepreneurs prefer lower costs, however entrepreneurs differ in
how they value a decrease in trading costs. Hence, in equilibrium, competing exchanges
obtain positive expected profits by choosing different trading costs and different listing
fees. As a result, firms that list on different exchanges have different characteristics. The
model has testable implications for the cross–sectional characteristics of IPOs on different
quality exchanges and the relationship between the level of trading costs and listing fees.
Keywords: Exchanges, Trading Costs, Listings, Competition, Vertical Differentiation.
1 Introduction
Stock pete to attract new listings. In the ., Nasdaq and the NYSE
compete for domestic and foreign listings. In Europe, inter–petition is par-
ticularly fierce for the listings of small Listings