文档介绍：原文
Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Asia’s Emerging Markets
This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm-level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asiancountries, in addition to the country-level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, . when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti-director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter-intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003).
1、Introduction
Studies of earnings management (here after, EM) have recently attracted a lot of attention because of the accounting fraud at Enron, , Xerox, Royal Ahold, Health South, and so on. The increasing attention to the quality of reported earnings makes the study of earnings management important again(Levitt, 2000). Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that earnings management is the alternation of firms’ reported economic performance by insiders to either “mislead some stakeholders” or to “influence contractual es”. It is premised that insiders engage in EM to dilute their rent-seeking activities from outsiders. That is, EM is used to reduce outsider i