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上市公司控制权安排研究——以阿里巴巴合伙人制度为例.docx

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上市公司控制权安排研究——以阿里巴巴合伙人制度为例.docx

上传人:wz_198613 2018/7/16 文件大小:1.01 MB

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上市公司控制权安排研究——以阿里巴巴合伙人制度为例.docx

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阿里巴巴申请以其独创的“合伙人制度”上市,遭香港资本市场拒绝,却受到美国资本市场的欢迎,这对完善我国内地资本市场而言有较大的研究意义。
本文采用案例研究的方法,首先介绍了 2013 年至 2014 年间阿里巴巴由香港转赴美国的上市历程及贯穿其中的合伙人制度,随后分析了合伙人制度的本质、创新意义及优缺点, 并结合相关历史背景揭示了美国资本市场接纳合伙人制度的原因。
本文研究发现,合伙人制度本质上是双重股权结构的一种创新形式,其与双重股权结构是同一类控制权安排。这类控制权安排有利于公司实现长期发展,并能激励管理团队投入高度匹配的人力资本;但这类控制权安排也可能沦为控制性股东谋取控制权私利的工具,并使得控制权市场对管理层的监督失效,同时这类控制权安排可能会违背公平原则。美国资本市场之所以能接纳这类有缺陷的控制权安排,是因为其具备完善的信息披露制度、以成熟的机构投资者为主的投资者结构和健全的集体诉讼制度。这对于完善我国内地资本市场的启示是:将来条件成熟时应对类似合伙人制度的控制权安排“解禁”,进而实现资本市场多方共赢;在借鉴美国经验的基础上,笔者分析了我国相关配套机制的缺陷, 并从完善信息披露制度、纠正投资者投资理念并完善投资者结构、完善证券侵权诉讼制度三个方面相应地提出了一些为“解禁”创造条件的建议。关键词:控制权安排,合伙人制度,双重股权结构
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Abstract
An application of Alibaba Group, according to which Alibaba can introduce an original structure called Alibaba Partnership after an IPO, was rejected by regulators of Hong Kong’s capital market. However, the same application has been accepted by regulators of United States’s capital market. This event makes a significant sense to improvement of mainland China's capital market.
This paper adopted a method of case study. Alibaba applied for being listed in Hong Kong Exchange in 2013, and essfully make its IPO in New York Stock Exchange in 2014. The first part of the paper contains an introduction of events that occurred in between and an introduction of Alibaba Partnership. In the next part, the author analyzed essence, innovation, merit and demerit of Alibaba Partnership and revealed reasons why the regulators of United States’s capital market admitted Alibaba Partnership based on relevant historical background.
The study found that Alibaba Partnership is essentially a new form of dual-class ownership structures. Both of them belong to a same kind of control arrangement. Such control arrangement can help pany to achieve long-term development and motivate management to invest human capital that highly matched pany. However, such control arrangement may e controlling shareholders’ tool of seeking private benefits. In addition, it will disable supervision of market for corporate c