文档介绍：Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision under Risk
Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky
Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2 (Mar., 1979),263-292.
Stable URL:
http://links./sici?sici=0012-9682%28197903%2947%3A2%3C263%3APTAAOD%%3B2-3
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
ut/. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you
have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and
you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, mercial use.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or
printed page of such transmission.
Econometrica is published by The Econometric Society. Please contact the publisher for further permissions
regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
rnals/.
Econometrica
©1979 The Econometric Society
JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the . Patent and Trademark Office.
For more information on JSTOR contactjstor-******@.
©2003 JSTOR
/
Sat Apr 12 13:26:25 2003
ECONOMETRICA
VOLUME 47 MARCH, 1979 NUMBER 2
PROSPECT THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION UNDER RISK
By DANIEL KAHNEMANAND AMOSTVERSKyl
This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of
decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory.
Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with
the basic s of utility theory. In particular, people underweight es that are
merely probable parison with es that are obtained with certainty. This
tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure
gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people