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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk STOR
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky
Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2 (Mar., 1979), 263-292.
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E C O N O M E T R I C A
VOLUME 47 MARCH, 1979 NUMBER 2
PROSPECT THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION UNDER RISK
BY DANIEL KAHNEMAN AND AMOS TVERSKY1
This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision
making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among
risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic s of
utility theory. In particular, people underweight es that are merely probable in
comparison with es that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the
certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk
seeking