文档介绍：厦门大学学位论文原创性声明
兹呈交的学位论文,是本人在导师指导下独立完成的研究成果。本人在论文写作中参考的其他个人或集体的研究成果,均在文中以明确方式标明。本人依法享有和承担由此论文而产生的权利和责任。
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内容提要
本文回顾了九十年代中期以来我国旅游景区管理体制的演变,总结了当前学术界关于景区经营权转让利弊得失的各种观点,用现代产权经济学及规制经济学的观点分析了经营权转让前,我国风景名胜区管理体制中存在的弊病,通过设立一个多任务委托-代理模型探讨了风景名胜区经营管理中资源开发与环境保护两个不相容的政府政策激励对景区经营主体行为的影响,从理论上证明了在信息不对称的条件下将景区经营权出让给预算严格的独立法人,有利于政府激励经营者同时在资源开发和环境保护上都施加高水平的努力。
本文的创新之处在于,为景区经营权转让的讨论引进了一种新的视角,将激励理论引入景区管理体制分析过程,勾勒了我国景区管理中的委托-代理框架,围绕资源开发和环境保护这两项不对称的任务构建了一个多任务委托-代理模型,通过对模型的求解得出本文的中心论点。
对景区资源价值的准确评估是构建本文模型的重要基础。在景区管理的多任务委托-代理框架下,保证资源开发和环境保护两项任务绩效的可观测性是防止经营主体对资源过度开发利用的基础,环境保护活动的绩效体现在资源价值的提升或削减上,当保护活动为不可观测时,在资源开发活动上的激励契约会诱使景区经营主体对资源的过度开发利用,因此,本文还花费大量篇幅介绍了CVM资源价值评估方法。
关键词:激励理论;信息不对称;委托代理;价值计量
Abstract
This paper reviews the historical management system evolution of nature-based tourism resources and analyzes the weakness and inefficiency of management system under government operating model. Under a multi-task principal-agent model, it analyzes the impact of tourism development and environment protection in nature-base tourism resources on the incentives of enterprise managers or government officials and proves that with the asymmetry information between the operator and the supervisor, the agent and the principal, operating contract offered by the government can encourage enterprise managers’better performance on both tourism development and environment protection.
This paper outlines the principal-agent frame of nature-based tourism resources development in China and shows a new approach to evaluate the efficiency of it with incentive theory. All conclusions can be deduced from this multi-task principal-agent model.
Under multi-task model, making performance in tourism development and environment protection measurable can provide an opportunity for first-best contract between principal and agent. The key premise we assume in our model is that nature-based tourism resources evaluation can be done easily, which protects nature resources from overused efficiently. In this p