文档介绍：Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the
memory argument
Sanford C. Goldberg
1. Motivating the assumption: Burge on self-knowledge
The thesis of this paper is that, in the context of an externalism about
content, the assumption that
true justified self-ascription amounts to (or otherwise entails) self-
knowledge of content
is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as ‘the
central assumption.’) Since I will be hanging much on a somewhat non-
standard take on the self-knowledge debate, I will review the debate with
an eye towards motivating the central assumption; in the section that
follows I reconstruct an argument whose point (I claim) is to challenge that
assumption.
Many people worry about patibility of the following two claims:
(1) We have introspective and authoritative self-knowledge of the
content of our intentional states (the doctrine of authoritative
self-knowledge).
(2) Some contents cannot be individuated in terms of properties of
the individual considered in isolation from her social and physi-
cal environment (the doctrine of externalism).
This presents a problem for those who think that we have independent
reasons to hold both Hence the reconciliation problem: to
show that, despite appearances, these two doctrines can be reconciled.
Burge 1988 contains a proposal based on the observation th