文档介绍：The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2008, 467–483
Resolving the paradox of social standards and export
competitiveness
Stephen B. DeLoach* and Jayoti Das
Campus Box 2075, Elon University, NC 27244, USA
(Received October 2007; final version received February 2008)
Over the last decade there has been increasing international pressure on
countries to raise ‘social standards’(. production standards based on
environmental and labor conditions). Currently, the World Trade
Organization does not allow countries to impose minimum standards on
imports based on environmental or labor standards because it is
assumed to petition. There is no consensus in the
empirical literature, however, to support this claim. In fact, the evidence
suggests that while stronger environmental standards petitive-
ness, stronger labor standards do the opposite. This paper offers one
possible explanation for this paradox. In a simple model of plete
information, externally imposed standards may either increase or
decrease petitiveness of infant firms from developing countries
depending on the degree plementarity between the standard and
the production of high-quality goods.
Keywords: asymmetric information; competitiveness; product quality;
production standards
JEL Classification: F18, Q56, D82, L15
Introduction
One popular argument against the establishment of international ‘social
standards’(. production standards based on labor or environmental
concerns) is that it will harm developing countries. Forcing developing
countries to adhere to the higher production standards of their wealthier
trading partners is assumed to hurt petitiveness of its firms and
reduce its exports. This is an especially powerful argument since developing
countries are typically endowed with infant firms attempting to gain a
foothold in established world markets. Without the benefit of an
international reputation, infant firms