文档介绍：山西财经大学
硕士学位论文
我国企业股票期权激励制度的问题研究
姓名:盖永鹏
申请学位级别:硕士
专业:劳动经济学
指导教师:王玉珍
2007-03-26
中文摘要
现代企业以所有权与经营权的分离为特征,所有者和经营者都是“有限理
性”的“经济人”,两者之间的目标不完全一致,且信息分布也不对称,因而不
可避免地出现经营者为追求自身效用最大化而采取有悖于委托人所有者利益
的行为,发生道德风险和逆向选择,导致委托人的风险成本增加,形成所谓的
“委托代理问题”。
世纪年代以来,以美国为首的发达国家和地区通过股票期权,在委托
代理双方之间建立起一种利益共享、风险共担的机制,通过期权的形式延期兑
现收益,并给予一定的选择性,进一步加强了长期激励效果,从而有效地缓解
了委托代理矛盾。通过分享剩余索取权的方式,充分肯定了人力资本的价值,
极大地推动了新经济的发展。
中国于世纪年代后期开始引入股票期权激励制度,相继产生了诸如
武汉模式、上海模式和北京模式等具有中国特色的股票激励制度。但由于我国
主板市场特殊的股权结构,这种实验的效果一直不是很理想。
本文在借鉴国外股票期权激励理论和实际运作的基础上,分析了我国的股
票期权激励制度的理论和发展历程,并立足于我国的现状,着重分析了我国推
行股票期权激励制度存在的问题,提出了完善我国上市公司股票期权激励制度
的对策,并设计了初步的框架性的股票期权实施方案。

【关键词】: 股票期权激励长期激励委托—代理

1
Abstract
The separation of the ownership and managership is one of the key
characteristic of the modern enterprises, among which the owner and
manager are both economic people of limited logos, whose aim are not
completely same, information is not symmetrical, so that it is unavoidable
that the manager try to maximize his profit which are against the owner’s
morality risk and retrorse choice make the risk cost of the
consigner increase, which will be formed to “entrustment agency
problem”.
From the eighties of 20th century, many developed countries lead by
US bean to establish a system of benefit-share and risk-share through
stock futures. The profit is delayed by the form of futures, which
strengthened long term inspiriting effect and released the nconsistency
between the entruster and agent. By sharing the surplus value, the human
value is fully acknowledged which greatly hoist the new economy.
From ies of 20th century, China imported this stock futures
inspiriting system, as a result, some new system with Chinese
characteristic brought into birth one after the other, like Wuhan model,
Shanghai model and Beijing model, etc. However, due to our special
structure in the main market, the effect is not so ideal yet.

2
Based on the sto