文档介绍：Pacific Economic Review, 7: 1 (2002) pp. 13–30
FINANCIAL MARKET STABILITY AND ARY
POLICY
JOSEPH STIGLITZ Columbia University, USA
1. INTRODUCTION
There are three central questions that I want to address today. The first is, what
is the first role of the ary policy on economic performance and stability
especially in response to a crisis. I am going to argue1 that the use of ary
policy in response to the Asian financial crisis was worse than ineffective: it
worsened the economic downturn and, worse still, contributed to global eco-
nomic instability.
I want to go from this description of what was wrong with the policies and
economic analysis underlying them to the question of why were these economic
policies pursued. This is part of what is called the political economy of the crisis,
trying to understand the behaviour of the institutions responsible for formu-
lating the policies. I would argue that we have spent too little time thinking
about the behaviour of the international economic and financial institutions,
given the important role that they play today in the global economy.
I am going to argue that the International ary Fund (IMF) changed
the mandate from Keynes’ original conception. Keynes was one the con-
ceptual founders of the IMF. He believed, or at least hoped, that such an
institution would contribute to global stability, not to global instability. What
I am going to argue is that it had changed its mandate from focusing on
global financial stability and to providing liquidity to countries facing eco-
nomic downturns, in order to sustain their economies at as close to full
employment as possible, to pursuing an agenda that reflected the special
interests of the munity, in its worst manifestation to ing if
not the bill collector of the advanced industrial countries, an institution at
least to enhance the likelihood that the creditors will be repaid. How do we
explain this change of mandate? I want to suggest that it has to do with