文档介绍：本科毕业设计(论文)
文献综述
原文二:
An Empirical Investigation of EVA and pensation
ABSTRACT
Despite a growing literature, the relationship between the structure of pensation and firm performance is not fully understood. Furthermore, little work has been done on the link between Economic Value Added as a measure of firm performance and the form of pensation. An examination of pensation structure and economic value added of panies in 1995 – 1998 provides evidence supporting pensation. Economic Value Added is found to be positively and significantly related to incentive pensation. Cash based remuneration, was found to be unrelated to EVA performance.
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the alignment of EVA with management pay incentives in an agency theory context. Agency theory has been widely applied to the study of pensation in an endeavor to establish whether executive rewards are being set in a manner consistent with the theory. The theory posits that the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance will be dependent upon risk sharing considerations, the level of monitoring of the executive by the owners and the degree to which their respective incentives are aligned. Despite extensive study, Finklestein and Ham brick (1996, ) suggest that ‘in sum, a significant gap seems to exist between economic predictions of the consequences of pensation and actual empirical results.’ Results for models of CEO incentives to both market and accounting return measures have produced only small explanatory power (Rosen, 1990). This study broadens prior research in the area of pensation by using EVA as a measure of value delivered to shareholders and reporting its
alignment with CEO pay es.
BACKGROUND
Agency theory requires the separation of ownership (principal) from the management (agent) of a firm. This division leads to agency costs, where managers exploit their superior information (information asymmetry) to maximize their own utility. Rosen (