文档介绍：第 2 卷第 3 期福建工程学院学报 Vol. 2 No. 3
2004 年 9 月 Journal of Fujian University of T echnology Sep. 2004
文章编号: 1672- 4348( 2004) 03- 0285- 06
经理股票期权定价模型及实证研究
刘国买
( 福建工程学院教务处, 福建
福州
350014)
摘要: 经理股票期权是为解决现代企业委托代理问题而向经理人员提供的一项激励制度。传统经理
股票期权存在外部
噪音
对股价影响带来经理收益与实际贡献不相符和经理作为内部人有操作股价
变动牟利的问题。文章为了解决以上两个方面问题, 构建了平均价格期权、重新定价期权、双障碍期
权和业绩比较期权等 4 种经理股票期权, 并与传统经理股票期权进行对比分析, 探讨了不同期权方案
的特点及其适应范围。
关键词: 经理期权激励; 平均价格期权; 重新定价期权; 双障碍期权; 业绩比较期权
中图分类号: F244 文献标识码: A
The option pricing models for executive incentive and their empirical analysis
LIU Guo- mai
( Academic Affairs Office, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350014, China)
Abstract: Executive stock option is an incentive mechanism for solving the principal- agency problem in
modern enterprises. Traditional executive stock option gives rise to inconsistency in the executive
s gain
and his contribution, as is either influenced by the outside
noise
or manipulated by the insider. Four
models of mean price option i. e. resetting price option, double- barrier price option parative
performance option aimed to solve the problem are constructed and contrasted with the traditional execu
tive stock option. The properties of the models and their application scope are also discussed.
Keywords: executive option incentive; mean price option; resetting price option; double- barrier price
option; comparative p