文档介绍：国有企业高管权力丶薪酬激励与企业投资
汕头大学硕士学位论文国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资姓名:袁长生申请学位级别:硕士专业:会计学指导教师:何文标2009-11-30
汕头大学硕士研究生毕业论文国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资摘要我国的国有上市公司存在投资决策非效率化,包括过度投资或者投资不足。在两类非效率投资中,过度投资比较明显。两类非效率投资都会影响企业绩效、降低企业价值、不利于股东财富最大化。选用我国沪深A股上市公司2005-2008年的数据作为样本,检验结果是:过度投资规模大于投资不足规模,该结论不受终级控制人性质影响。地方国有企业中高管薪酬激励与过度投资显著正相关关系;在其它性质时,则二者没有发现有显著正相关关系。所有类型国有企业中,用任期代表高管权力与高管薪酬显著正相关。我国国有上市公司高管权力过大,是导致过度投资的一个原因,权力结构问题是代理成本的一个方面。综合分析高管权力、薪酬激励对资本投资,最终证实契约失效,可能不在契约本身,而在于契约之外的权力约束机制。关键词: 过度投资; 投资不足; 高管权力; 高管薪酬 III
汕头大学硕士研究生毕业论文国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资 ABSTRACT There are many non-efficiency investment decisions, including the over-investment or under-investment in China's state-owned panies,. In the two types of non-efficient investments, over-investment is more relatively clear. Two types of non-efficiency investments will affect the business performance and lower enterprise value, which do harm to shareholder wealth. panies in China in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed data for the year 2005-2008 as samples, test results are: the number of over-investment samples is less than the number of panies 0f under-investment, but the over-investment is larger than the scale of under-investment, the conclusion is proved in all kind of State-Owned Enterprises . There is a significant positive correlation between over-investment incentive and pensation in Local state-owned enterprises; the nature of state-owned enterprises in other levels, then the difference was not found to have a significant positive correlation. All types of state-owned enterprises, with a term of executive power and pensation on behalf of a significant positive correlation. China's state-owned pany executives too much power, is one of the reasons leading to over-investment, the power structure is one aspect of agency costs. prehensive analysis of executive power, pay incentives for capital investment, contract u
ltimately proves ineffective, it may not contract itself, but rather the power to contract beyond the restraint mecha